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I. INTRODUCTION 
¶1 As the Internet transitions from a new and emerging technology to a mature and 
developed medium, its overall effect continues to grow.  In a relatively short period of 
time, this multimedia form of communication now influences almost all aspects of a 
person’s daily life.  The Internet has enabled users to reach out to and hear from other 
users throughout the world.  While it now has the potential for a worldwide impact, 
completely unique forms and methods of communication have developed at the same 
time.  Tools, such as message boards, blogs, and other social networking features, allow 
an individual opinion to reach an incredible audience with extreme speed and simplicity.  
¶2 With these new tools and possibilities have come new questions about their 
consequences.  Because much of what is written in blogs and on message boards is done 
anonymously, internet services and websites have quickly garnered negative and 
defamatory postings about individual non-public people.  These pieces of information 
could easily threaten individuals’ reputations and privacy.  In spite of these negative 
consequences, Congress chose to further incentivize the development and expansion of 
new types of internet services because of tremendous social and economic opportunities.  
With the passage of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA), interactive 
computer service providers were granted immunity from suits over content created by 
third-parties posted on their services.1  However, the CDA also carves out an exception to 
this immunity for intellectual property claims.  While it is generally clear that intellectual 
property includes federal intellectual property laws, such as patents, copyrights, and 
trademarks, it is less clear whether state claims, such as right of publicity, are also exempt 
from the CDA’s immunity.  
¶3 Several cases have arisen recently, where an individual has sued a website or 
internet service for allowing a third-party to write or publish information that could 
damage the individual’s reputation.  That individual then sued to hold the internet service 
liable.  A split is likely developing between circuit courts regarding whether the CDA 
 
* J.D. Candidate 2011, Northwestern University School of Law.  Special thanks to my wife, Becca, for 
her incredible help, support, and constant understanding. 
1 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006).  The statute defines “interactive computer service” as “any information 
service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a 
computer server, including specifically a service or system that provides access to the Internet and such 
systems operated or services offered by libraries or educational institutions.”  42 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2). 
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covers claims such as right of publicity, or whether it only applies to federal intellectual 
property laws.  This distinction is likely to become more prominent as more people seek 
to hold websites and internet services liable.  
¶4 This Comment examines the circuit split, how best to resolve it, and the potential 
need for Congress to rethink the CDA.  Part II looks at the background and development 
of the CDA and at the right of publicity.  Part III examines the emerging circuit split 
between interpreting the CDA to include or exclude the right of publicity and in which 
direction the courts should ultimately side based on where the law currently stands.  Part 
IV addresses the potential effects and outcomes of this split and how Congress may need 
to readdress the CDA.  Part V concludes that the goals and incentives that Congress 
intended to achieve and implement are still necessary, but the statute’s provisions require 
further defining. 
II. BACKGROUND OF THE RIGHT TO PUBLICITY AND EARLY INTERNET LIABILITY 
A. Right of Publicity 
¶5 In general, the right of publicity is “the inherent right of every human being to 
control the commercial use of his or her identity.”2  The claim stems from the broader 
right to privacy in which a person has a basic right “to be let alone.”3  On the other hand, 
the right of publicity has also been characterized as “an inherent property right of all 
individuals,” which is distinct from the right to privacy.4  Consequently, everyone has a 
right of publicity, the commercial value of which each person can control, license, and 
market.5  Regardless of the different bases and developments of the right of publicity, it 
has important consequences in modern technological contexts.  The right of publicity 
varies by state.  Different states require different elements, and a number of states do not 
recognize the claim at all.6  In states that do recognize it, a right of publicity would 
prevent another party from unauthorized use of someone’s image or likeness.7  
Consequently, the right of publicity may apply in situations where false information is 
written about someone on an internet website.  In other words, plaintiffs have attempted 
to assert this right to protect themselves and to hold another party liable. 
B. Liability for Internet Providers/Services 
¶6 The potential for, and consequences of, holding internet providers liable for a third-
party’s use of an individual’s image or likeness was highlighted in 1995 in Stratton 
 
2 J. Thomas McCarthy, Melville B. Nimmer and the Right of Publicity: A Tribute, 34 UCLA L. REV. 
1703, 1704 (1987).  See also Almeida v. Amazon.com, Inc., 456 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir. 2006) (reviewing 
how several cases and other sources have defined the right of publicity). 
3 Matthew Minora, Comment, Rumor Has It That Non-Celebrity Gossip Web Site Operators Are 
Overestimating Their Immunity Under the Communications Decency Act, 17 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 821, 
848–49 (2009) (citing Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 
195 (1890)). 
4 Id. at 851. 
5 McCarthy, supra note 2, at 1710–11. 
6 Minora, supra note 3, at 853–54. 
7 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (1995). 
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Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co.8  Prodigy controlled a network of two million 
subscribers who could communicate with each other through various electronic bulletin 
boards.9  One of these electronic bulletin boards enabled users to post and discuss 
financial and investment information.10  One particular user made several negative 
statements and criminal accusations about Stratton Oakmont.11  Stratton Oakmont did not 
identify the specific user who posted the statements but instead chose to sue Prodigy.  
Specifically, Stratton Oakmont claimed that Prodigy should be considered a publisher, 
“subject to liability as if [it] had originally published” the defamatory and libelous 
statements.12  In response, Prodigy argued that it is more appropriate to treat the situation 
as analogous to a distributor, “such as book stores and libraries [that] may be liable for 
defamatory statements of others only if they knew or had reason to know of the 
defamatory statement at issue.”13 
¶7 Ultimately, the court relied on two issues when determining that Prodigy should be 
treated as a publisher.  First, “Prodigy held itself out to the public and its members as 
controlling the content of its computer bulletin boards.”14  Second, it utilized a 
combination of a software screening program and board leaders to remove certain 
content.15  As a result, Prodigy was found liable for defamatory statements made on its 
service.   
¶8 In other words, Prodigy had placed itself in a position where it could exercise some 
degree of editorial control.  Specifically, the court explained, “Prodigy has uniquely 
arrogated to itself the role of determining what is proper for its members to post and read 
on its bulletin boards.”16  Unlike a bookstore or library, Prodigy chose to implement 
certain policies and services to achieve the benefits of control.17  By doing so, it 
transformed itself into a publisher subject to broader liability.18  However, the court did 
note that these issues “may ultimately be preempted by federal law if the 
Communications Decency Act of 1995” was passed by Congress.19 
¶9 It quickly became clear that the potential for liability could distort incentives and 
create severe consequences for a new media company.  Prodigy had been found liable, in 
part, because it had implemented some degree of control and made some effort to exert 
editorial influence.  In effect, Prodigy opened itself up to liability, because it attempted to 
monitor the content posted on its service.  In other words, “an operator . . . which 
assumed the responsibility for at least attempting to keep defamatory or offensive 
material from being posted on its bulletin boards, was liable as a publisher for defamatory 
postings, but an operator . . . which made no such attempt escaped publisher liability.”20  
 
8 Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 
1995). 
9 Id. at *1. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. at *3. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. at *4. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. at *5. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
20 David R. Sheridan, Zeran v. AOL and the Effect of Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act 
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¶10 This decision could drastically impact new internet services.  It seemed likely to 
have a direct influence on policy decisions at these new companies.  From a government 
standpoint, “Congress feared that these sorts of decisions would result in a chilling effect 
on Internet speech because the potential to face publisher liability would create a 
disincentive for [Internet Service Providers] to function.”21  As newer technologies 
enabled larger numbers of people to create and post content very quickly, companies 
could not realistically monitor their services to the degree necessary to protect themselves 
from liability.  Consequently, Congress became very concerned about restricting 
innovation and development. 
III. THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT AND EMERGING CIRCUIT SPLIT 
A. The Communications Decency Act 
¶11 Congress enacted the Communications Decency Act in 1996.22  The statute was 
written partially in response to the recent Stratton Oakmont decision.  One major goal 
was to give greater protections to service providers by ensuring that “[n]o provider or 
user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any 
information provided by another information content provider.”23  Because Stratton 
Oakmont exposed the potential for liability, “Congress enacted [the CDA] to remove the 
disincentives to self regulation created by the Stratton Oakmont decision.”24  Overall, 
Congress hoped the new legislation would correct the misaligned incentives for an 
internet provider attempting to regulate its content.25 
¶12 Furthermore, as the Internet was still in its very early stages, it greatly benefited 
from public policy “to promote [its] continued development . . . to preserve the vibrant 
and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet . . . to encourage the 
development of technologies which maximize user control . . . [and] to remove 
disincentives for the development and utilization of blocking and filtering 
technologies . . . .”26  Through the statute, Congress hoped to promote the continued 
development of the Internet, while acknowledging that it would be impossible for service 
providers to review for defamatory information in all of the content within their control.27  
Congress desired to achieve these objectives with little government regulation by creating 
the correct incentives and removing liability disincentives.  By reducing risks and 
regulations, Congress made a “policy choice by providing immunity even where the 
 
upon Liability for Defamation on the Internet, 61 ALB. L. REV. 147, 158 (1997). 
21 Melissa A. Troiano, Comment, The New Journalism? Why Traditional Defamation Laws Should 
Apply to Internet Blogs, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 1447, 1456 (2006). 
22 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006). 
23 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).  “The term ‘interactive computer service’ means any information service, 
system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a 
computer server, including specifically a service or system that provides access to the Internet and such 
systems operated or services offered by libraries or educational institutions.”  47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2). 
24 Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997).  See also Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 
1018, 1026 (9th Cir. 2003) (discussing legislative history of § 230); Sheridan, supra note 20, at 161 
(discussing conference report of § 230). 
25 Troiano, supra note 21, at 1455–56. 
26 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(1)–(5). 
27 Troiano, supra note 21, at 1456. 
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interactive service provider has an active, even aggressive role in making available 
content prepared by others.”28 
¶13 The primary method by which Congress hoped to accomplish these goals was to 
provide immunity from liability for internet service providers and users.  In Stratton 
Oakmont, the court evaluated Prodigy as a re-publisher.  In order to protect other service 
providers, the CDA specifies that interactive computer service providers will not be 
treated as publishers of the content on their services provided by others.29  Shortly after 
the passage of the act, the courts began to interpret and apply this provision.  As the court 
in Zeran v. America Online, Inc., explained: 
By its plain language, § 230 creates a federal immunity to any cause of action 
that would make service providers liable for information originating with a third-
party user of the service.  Specifically, § 230 precludes courts from entertaining 
claims that would place a computer service provider in a publisher’s role.  Thus, 
lawsuits seeking to hold a service provider liable for its exercise of a publisher’s 
traditional editorial function—such as deciding whether to publish, withdraw, 
postpone or alter content—are barred.30 
Lawsuits aimed at service providers for third-party content created an obvious threat to 
free speech, so Congress established broad federal immunity.31 
¶14 Congress did create an important exception to this broad immunity.  While service 
providers would be protected from most claims, the CDA would not protect them from 
intellectual property claims: “[n]othing in [§ 230] shall be construed to limit or expand 
any law pertaining to intellectual property.”32  While this provision is relatively 
straightforward, it is not always clear what is considered a “law pertaining to intellectual 
property.”33  There is little doubt that federal IP laws, such as patent, copyright, and 
trademark, qualify as pertaining to intellectual property.  On the other hand, there are 
several other types, mostly state laws, which partially pertain to intellectual property.34  
These areas have caused significant confusion.  Plaintiffs hope that the courts will 
consider claims like the right of publicity as intellectual property based ones, while the 
internet providers argue otherwise.  
B. Excluding Right of Publicity from the CDA’s Intellectual Property Exception 
¶15 The Ninth Circuit confronted the question of how far the CDA’s immunity extends 
in Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc.35  Plaintiff Christianne Carafano began receiving 
 
28 Robert T. Langdon, Note, The Communications Decency Act § 230: Make Sense? Or Nonsense?—A 
Private Person’s Inability to Recover If Defamed in Cyberspace, 73 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 829, 852 (1999). 
29 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). 
30 Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997). 
31 Id. at 330–31. 
32 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2). 
33 Id. 
34 See Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1119 n.5 (9th Cir. 2007) (State laws that may be 
characterized as intellectual property laws include “trademark, unfair competition, dilution, right of 
publicity and trade defamation.”). 
35 Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2003). 
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numerous threatening and sexually explicit phone calls, emails, and written letters.36  She 
soon discovered that several days earlier, an unknown person had posted a personal 
profile of her on Matchmaker.com, an internet dating service.37  Although the profile was 
not authorized by Carafano and was done without her knowledge, the creator posted 
pictures of her and listed several movies and television shows in which she had 
previously acted.38  The profile also displayed her home address, telephone number, and a 
fake contact email address.39  Soon after she began receiving the threatening calls, 
Carafano’s representative contacted Matchmaker.com.  The company first blocked access 
to the profile and later deleted it entirely.40  Carafano then proceeded to file a complaint 
against Matchmaker.com alleging several claims, including misappropriation of the right 
of publicity.41 
¶16 After the trial court rejected the claim for misappropriation, Carafano appealed.  
The Ninth Circuit addressed “whether [her] claims are barred by 47 U.S.C. 
§ 230(c)(1) . . . .”42  The court first determined that Matchmaker.com is closer to an 
interactive computer service than an information content provider, because the profile 
created by the user does not have any content until that content is provided by the user.43  
In other words, “so long as a third party willingly provides the essential published 
content, the interactive service provider receives full immunity regardless of the specific 
editing or selection process.”44  
¶17 Furthermore, the court was reluctant to hold the defendant accountable, because 
“Congress made a policy choice . . . not to deter harmful online speech through the 
separate route of imposing tort liability on companies that serve as intermediaries for 
other parties’ potentially injurious messages.”45  By imposing this type of liability, these 
new intermediary types of services could easily restrict free speech.  Congress was 
unwilling to allow this result.  Although Carafano argued that Matchmaker.com partially 
contributed to the content of the posted information by providing structure, “Matchmaker 
still lacks responsibility for the ‘underlying misinformation.’”46  In Carafano, the Ninth 
Circuit relied heavily on policy implications when holding that the CDA’s immunity for 
service providers also included protection from misappropriation of the right of publicity 
suits.  Congress chose to protect free speech.  More importantly, it granted websites the 
freedom to use third-party provided information to create and develop new services.  
Through this decision, the court implicitly signaled that it would not consider 
misappropriation of right of publicity as an intellectual property claim, because it would 
consequently be excluded from the CDA’s immunity.47 
 




40 Id. at 1122. 
41 Id.  
42 Id. 
43 Id. at 1124. 
44 Id.  See also Jurin v. Google, Inc., 695 F. Supp. 2d 1117, 1122 (E.D. Cal. 2010). 
45 Jurin, 695 F. Supp. 2d at 1123 (quoting Zeran v. Am. Online, 129 F.3d 327, 330–31 (4th Cir. 1997)). 
46 Id. at 1125. 
47 See Patricia Sanchez Abril, Repu-taint Sites and the Limits of § 230 Immunity, 12 No. 7 J. INTERNET 
L. 3, 5 (2009). 
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¶18 Several years later, the Ninth Circuit more directly addressed how state claims such 
as the right of publicity relate to the CDA’s intellectual property provision in Perfect 10, 
Inc. v. CCBill LLC.48  Perfect 10 is a publisher of a magazine and website featuring 
models, most of whom have released and assigned their rights of publicity to Perfect 10.49  
Defendants provide services, such as web hosting and data center connections as well as 
allowing customers to use credit cards.50  Perfect 10 alleged various claims against the 
defendants, including violation of right of publicity.51 
¶19 Unlike the earlier Carafano case, the Ninth Circuit in Perfect 10 directly addressed 
the CDA’s intellectual property exception.52  While courts have interpreted the CDA to 
protect internet services from liability for information provided by third-parties, this 
immunity is not unlimited.  Courts must “construe Section 230(c)(1) in a manner that 
would neither ‘limit or expand any law pertaining to intellectual property.’”53  While the 
CDA makes a clear exception, it “does not contain an express definition of ‘intellectual 
property,’ and there are many types of claims in both state and federal law which may—
or may not—be characterized as ‘intellectual property’ claims.”54  
¶20 If a broad interpretation of intellectual property were adopted that included many of 
these claims, the court would be “permitting the reach of any particular state’s definition 
of intellectual property to dictate the contours of this federal immunity . . . .”55  In other 
words, a state would have the ability to alter and restrict the congressionally created 
immunity merely by creating its own definition of intellectual property.  The court held 
that this “would be contrary to Congress’s expressed goal of insulating the development 
of the Internet from the various state-law regimes.”56  
¶21 Because the CDA’s intellectual property exception constrains the general liability 
immunity, the broader a court’s interpretation of intellectual property, the narrower the 
CDA’s immunity becomes.  Therefore, because Congress did not explicitly define 
intellectual property but did state an explicit policy of fostering innovation and free 
speech, the court construed intellectual property to mean only federal intellectual 
property.57 
¶22 The Ninth Circuit has chosen to interpret the CDA to not include state intellectual 
property claims, including the right of publicity, within the exception to the statute’s 
liability protection.  In order to resolve the statute’s lack of explicit definition for 
intellectual property, the court looked to various policy implications.58  By granting any 
immunity in the first place, “Congress intended to treat the Internet differently from 
 
48 Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2007). 
49 Id. at 1108. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 See also Almeida v. Amazon.com, Inc., 456 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir. 2006) (general discussion of right of 
publicity and § 230, but unnecessary for district court to address whether the CDA preempts right of 
publicity claim). 
53 Gucci Am., Inc. v. Hall & Assocs., 135 F. Supp. 2d 409, 413 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (quoting 47 U.S.C. 
§ 230(e)(2) (2006)). 
54 Perfect 10, 488 F.3d at 1118. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. at 1119. 
58 Id. at 1118. 
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traditional forms of communication such as newspapers, radio, and television.”59  The 
court likely wanted to draw a clear line, because “[s]tates have any number of laws that 
could be characterized as intellectual property laws: trademark, unfair competition, 
dilution, right of publicity and trade defamation . . . .”60  Despite the significance of such 
an interpretation, the Ninth Circuit is unique in how it directly and explicitly analyzed 
this provision of the CDA.61  It still remains to be seen exactly how this will affect 
potential plaintiffs within the Ninth Circuit’s jurisdiction. 
¶23 By broadening the immunity exception to include a number of claims beyond 
federal intellectual property, the court risked eliminating the protections that Congress 
intended to provide.  In contrast, the Ninth Circuit focused on the policy of fostering free 
speech and encouraging innovation in new internet services.62  This policy requires broad 
immunity protection and therefore a narrow intellectual property exception. 
C. Including the Right of Publicity in the CDA’s Intellectual Property Exception 
¶24 While the Ninth Circuit has interpreted the CDA’s intellectual property exception 
to exclude state claims, other courts have proceeded in the opposite direction.  The First 
Circuit indirectly addressed the issue in Universal Communications Systems, Inc. v. 
Lycos, Inc.63  Defendant Lycos operates various websites related to stock and financial 
information.  One feature of these websites is message board hosting.  Message board 
hosting allows users to post and discuss information about publicly traded companies.64  
Plaintiff Universal Communications Systems (UCS) alleged that one or more third-party 
users posted false and misleading information about UCS’s financial condition and 
management.65  Consequently, the company sued Lycos on various grounds, including a 
state claim of dilution of trade name.66  This charge differs from the misappropriation of 
the right of publicity charge in the Ninth Circuit cases.  Nonetheless, it is a state claim 
arguably pertaining to intellectual property, which was indirectly addressed by the court.  
The district court held that § 230 of the CDA extended immunity to Lycos, and it 
dismissed the claims.67 
¶25 Ultimately, the court affirmed the dismissal on other grounds, specifically “because 
of the serious First Amendment issues that would be raised by allowing UCS’s 
claim . . . .”68  However, the court still stated when first referring to the trademark 
dilution claim, that “[c]laims based on intellectual property laws are not subject to 
Section 230 immunity.”69  Because the court directly dismissed the claim on First 
Amendment grounds, any discussion of its relation to the CDA’s liability immunity and 
 
59 Minora, supra note 3, at 840. 
60 Perfect 10, 488 F.3d at 1119 n.5. 
61 Dylan M. Spaduzzi, Note, Publicity Enemy Number One: Federal Immunity for a Virtual World, 40 
U. MEM. L. REV. 603, 636 (2010). 
62 See Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330–31 (4th Cir. 1997) (“The specter of tort liability in 
an area of such prolific speech would have an obvious chilling effect.”). 
63 Universal Commc’ns Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413 (1st Cir. 2007). 
64 Id. at 415. 
65 Id. at 416. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 417. 
68 Id. at 423. 
69 Id. at 422–23 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2) (2006)). 
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intellectual exception was merely dicta.  However, the fact that the CDA’s intellectual 
property provision was discussed in the context of a state intellectual property claim 
provides precedent for later opinions to cite.   
¶26 The following year, another case, Doe v. Friendfinder Network, Inc.,70 directly 
addressed § 230 and state intellectual property claims in its decision.  Defendant 
Friendfinder operates various electronic groups that allow members to search for and 
meet others using personal online advertisements.71  Specifically, each user creates a 
profile that contains personal information that is viewable by other members.72  In 2005, 
an unknown user posting under a screen name created a profile for a female member.73  
This profile contained personal information including biographical data, a nude 
photograph, and sexual proclivities.74  For over a year, the plaintiff was unaware of, and 
certainly had not authorized, the profile’s existence, although she claimed that it 
reasonably identified her.75  
¶27 After discovering the profile, the plaintiff contacted Friendfinder and requested that 
the profile be removed.76  The defendant first replaced the profile with a message 
indicating its removal, but the profile continued to appear on other similar websites, 
search engines, and advertisements.77  Ultimately, the plaintiff filed suit against the 
defendants putting forth several claims, including invasion of privacy.78 
¶28 Similar to the analysis in previous cases, the court first noted that CDA provisions 
dictate that interactive computer service providers must be treated as publishers.  
Consequently, the providers are not liable for state law claims for publishing content 
provided by another information content provider.79  However, the CDA also provides 
that it does not expand or limit intellectual property laws.80  On this basis, the defendants 
argued that the CDA bars all of the state law claims.  In contrast, the plaintiff argued that 
“her claim for invasion of privacy is premised on a ‘law pertaining to intellectual 
property’ unaffected by the Act.”81  The court was directly confronted with the issue of 
how to interpret the intellectual property exception to the CDA’s service provider 
immunity. 
¶29 In analyzing the CDA, the Doe court took a more formal approach, focusing on the 
plain meaning of the text.  The court began with Universal’s dicta implying that § 230 
does not protect these types of claims.82  First, the intellectual property exception is 
drafted specifically as any law implying that there is no limit to only federal laws.83  
 
70 Doe v. Friendfinder Network, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 288 (D.N.H. 2008). 
71 Id. at 291. 
72 Id. 




77 Id.  The plaintiff also argued that the message indicating the profile’s removal “was itself false in 
communicating that she was a member of the service and that the profile had been hers in the first place.”  
Id. 
78 Id. at 298. 
79 Id. at 293 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1), (e)(3) (2006)). 
80 Id. at 294 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2)). 
81 Id. 
82 Id. at 299. 
83 Id. 
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Second, the court noted that other provisions of the statute specify federal or state laws.84  
In other words, Congress was aware of situations in which provisions could apply to 
either state or federal laws.  In other provisions, Congress directly specified a level of 
government when clearly referring to only state or only federal laws.  By not modifying 
intellectual property with the word “state” or “federal,” Congress did not intend to limit 
the immunity to either level of government.85  
¶30 Moreover, the court dismissed the policy arguments set forth by the Ninth Circuit 
in Perfect 10.  While allowing service providers to be held liable for state law intellectual 
property claims may create “some challenges for service providers like the defendants, 
those challenges would appear to be simply a cost of doing business on-line.”86  
Consequently, the court found it an acceptable tradeoff to granting providers complete 
immunity.  The court ultimately followed the Universal dicta.  It focused on the plain 
language of the law instead of following the Ninth Circuit’s attention to the policy’s 
implications and effects.  Both state and federal intellectual property laws were exempt 
from the CDA’s § 230 service provider immunity, and the defendant’s motion to dismiss 
the right of publicity claim was denied.87 
¶31 While some circuit courts have not definitively ruled on their own interpretations of 
§ 230(c)(1) and (e)(2), other district courts have addressed the issue.  In Atlantic 
Recording Corp. v. Project Playlist, Inc.,88 defendant Project Playlist operates a website 
that compiles links to sound recordings on other websites so that users can search for, 
listen to, and share songs.89  The plaintiffs own the copyrights to many of the songs 
Project Playlist posted, and they sued on several grounds, including claims for common-
law copyright infringement and unfair competition.90  Although copyright is normally a 
federal issue, the plaintiffs alleged a state law copyright infringement claim.  
Consequently, the court’s analysis is the same as other courts’ analysis of the right of 
publicity under the CDA. 
¶32 The court first concluded that Project Playlist first fell under the general immunity 
of § 230(c)(1).  The plaintiffs then argued that § 230(e)(2) applied, and that “the CDA 
does not limit any law pertaining to intellectual property, and therefore their state law 
claims can proceed.”91  The court followed a textual analysis of the statute and rejected 
the defendant’s motion to dismiss.92  Similar to the Doe court’s focus on the literal 
statutory text, the court held that the inclusion of the word “any” and the lack of the 
words “federal” or “state” indicated that the provision includes all types of intellectual 
property claims.93  Furthermore, the court reasoned that any analysis of the CDA’s 
history or purpose, such as in the Ninth Circuit’s reading, was inappropriate because the 
 
84 Id. at 299–300.  See 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(1) (“Nothing in this section shall be construed to impair the 
enforcement of . . . any other Federal criminal statute.”); 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3) (“Nothing in this section 
shall be construed to prevent any State from enforcing any State law . . . .”). 
85 Doe, 540 F. Supp. 2d at 300. 
86 Id. at 302. 
87 Id. at 304. 
88 Atl. Recording Corp. v. Project Playlist, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 2d 690 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
89 Id. at 693–94. 
90 Id. at 693, 698. 
91 Id. at 702. 
92 Id. at 704. 
93 Id. at 703–04. 
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plain language was clear.94  While looking to the specific policy goals of the CDA may 
lead courts to interpret § 230(e)(2) to exempt only federal intellectual property claims 
from the liability immunity, a plain textual analysis leads to the conclusion that all forms 
of intellectual property claims are exempt. 
D. Reconciling the Circuit Split 
¶33 While the courts have reached two competing interpretations of § 230(c)(1) and 
(e)(2) of the Communications Decency Act, this split must ultimately be resolved 
because of the vastly different outcomes to which each interpretation leads.  Based on the 
current views of certain state intellectual property claims and on the text of the act, all 
forms of intellectual property claims should be exempt from the CDA’s immunity 
exception provision.  
¶34 One of the first areas in which this issue arose was in the context of a person’s right 
of publicity.95  Because only some consider this a true intellectual property right, a 
service provider infringer may not be immune from liability.  Although the right of 
publicity is not based in federal law and has grown from a variety of rights and areas,96 it 
has “matured into a distinctive legal category occupying an important place in the law of 
intellectual property.”97  Furthermore, the right serves a purpose similar to other types of 
intellectual property, such as protecting an intangible quality or idea.98  The main 
difference between federal intellectual property rights (e.g., patents and copyrights) and 
state law claims (e.g., right of publicity) is merely how they were developed by Congress 
or state legislatures.   
¶35 When holding that the CDA only exempts federal intellectual property claims from 
its immunity, the Ninth Circuit focused on Congress’s intent to promote the development 
of the Internet.99  However, the fact that Congress intended to remove liability as an 
impediment to innovation does not explain how far the immunity exception should be 
extended.  Although the statute expressly states a goal of promoting Internet growth, it is 
clear that Congress did not intend to remove all liability.100  The exceptions to immunity 
were included precisely because Congress did not intend to grant complete and total 
protection. 
¶36 The Ninth Circuit went directly to what it perceived as the purpose of the CDA to 
guide its interpretation.  However, it may not even be necessary to look beyond the text 
itself,101 which is the case for this provision of the statute.  There are four clarifications in 
 
94 Id. at 704. 
95 See, e.g., Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2003); Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill 
LLC, 488 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2007); Doe v. Friendfinder Network, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 288 (D.N.H. 
2008). 
96 See supra Part II.A. 
97 McCarthy, supra note 2, at 1712. 
98 See Allison v. Vintage Sports Plaques, 136 F.3d 1443, 1448 (11th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he distinction that 
appellants draw between what is protected by the right of publicity and what is protected by other forms of 
intellectual property rights, such as copyright, is not sound.”).  See also ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 
332 F.3d 915, 928 (6th Cir. 2003). 
99 Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1125 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(1) (2006)). 
100 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2). 
101 See Atl. Recording Corp. v. Project Playlist, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 2d 690, 704 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) 
(“Because the plain language of the CDA is clear . . . the Court need not engage in an analysis of the 
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the statute regarding how it will affect other laws.  Each of these subsections, other than 
the intellectual property provision, specifies either state or federal law.102  Specifically, 
there is no effect on any federal criminal law, states are not prevented from enforcing 
consistent state law, and the Act does not limit application of any state law similar to the 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act.103  The lack of any state or federal modifier for 
the intellectual property exception clearly indicates an intention to not further limit its 
exception.  In contrast to the three other exceptions, intellectual property must refer to 
both state and federal claims.  As a result, “a court that interprets § 230(e)(2) to only 
apply to federal intellectual property law is improperly adding words to the statute and 
disregarding Congress’s obvious intention to remove federal immunity from state and 
federal intellectual property law claims.”104  If Congress had only intended to exclude 
federal intellectual property rights, it would have been as explicit as it was elsewhere in 
the statute.  
¶37 Moreover, this broad interpretation is further emphasized by the fact that the 
section applies to “any” intellectual property law.105  The use of “any” together with the 
lack of a “federal” or “state” modifier results in an unambiguous meaning of the statute’s 
plain language.  Courts should follow the First Circuit’s reading of the CDA and hold that 
service providers may be liable for all forms of intellectual property claims. 
IV. EFFECTS, OUTCOMES, AND FUTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY  
EXCEPTION TO CDA IMMUNITY 
¶38 Courts should interpret the Communications Decency Act to exclude both state and 
federal intellectual property claims from the service provider immunity.  This reading 
most accurately follows the current text.  However, Congress should reevaluate this 
outcome based on the goals of the statute and because of the latest effects.  In other 
words, the First Circuit’s interpretation may be the most correct, but the Ninth Circuit’s 
view may produce a better outcome. 
¶39 While § 230(e)(2) is meant to keep the CDA from interfering with existing 
intellectual property rights, it has also created a large exception to the law’s goal of 
immunizing service providers.  This exception may likely overtake the rule as injured 
individuals continue to seek compensation for their injuries.  Allowing service providers 
to continue to be held liable for state law claims such as the right of publicity “is 
inconsistent with the values hierarchy established by the [CDA] and with its underlying 
policy.”106  One of the consequences of the Internet’s openness, availability, and ease of 
 
CDA’s legislative history or purpose.”) (citing Lee v. Bankers Trust Co., 166 F.3d 540, 544 (2d Cir. 1999) 
(holding that plain meaning of a statute controls and legislative history only used if terms are ambiguous)). 
102 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(1)–(4). 
103 Id. 
104 Spaduzzi, supra note 61, at 640. 
105 Atl. Recording, 603 F. Supp. 2d at 704 (citing ACLU v. Dep’t of Def., 543 F.3d 59, 69 (2d Cir. 2008) 
(holding “any” should be given “expansive application where the surrounding statutory language and other 
relevant legislative context support it”)). 
106 Rachel A. Purcell, Note, Is That Really Me?: Social Networking and the Right of Publicity, 12 VAND. 
J. ENT. & TECH. L. 611, 634 (2010).  Furthermore, federal intellectual property rights are much more in 
need of protection because they directly lead to the creation of new ideas.  “While traditional intellectual 
property rights foster and reward innovation and invention, nothing need be created to take advantage of 
the inherent right of publicity.”  Id. at 634. 
 308
Vol. 9:3] Joshua Dubnow 
use is that many more people can be potential victims of defamation and suffer harm to 
their reputations.107  In other words, “technology makes us all public figures in a way that 
had never been anticipated by . . . the CDA.”108  Because anyone can be a victim, it is 
inevitable that many more people will look for a defendant to hold accountable.  
¶40 Although the CDA attempts to immunize service providers for liability from most 
of these injuries, the exceptions provide an opportunity for people to exploit.  An injured 
person may try to evade the CDA immunity and seek out new ways to hold internet 
service providers accountable.109  When plaintiffs are unable to hold service providers 
liable for defamatory content under normal theories of liability, they have “argu[ed] some 
novel theories of liability.”110  If all forms of intellectual property claims continue to be 
exempted, plaintiffs will continue to exploit this exception, eliminating much of the 
immunity that the CDA was meant to provide.  Based on Congress’s original goal of 
fostering innovation, it is unlikely that Congress meant to broaden the intellectual 
property exception to such an extent. 
¶41 Furthermore, Congress should reevaluate the CDA to revisit some of its original 
goals now that it has had several years to observe the effects.  One of the defined goals of 
the CDA was to encourage self-regulation.111  Because of the clear line the CDA draws 
between liability for service providers and content providers, services are incentivized to 
remain inactive.  Specifically, “[s]o long as the ISPs remain passive interactive computer 
services and do not cross the elusive line into ‘information content providers,’ the safe 
harbor applies, and they are immune.”112  This incentive has only increased as the amount 
of third-party information provided increases, and services find it harder to effectively 
monitor.  
¶42 In addition, a significant amount of time has passed since the CDA was adopted, 
and “the Internet is no longer a burgeoning medium that needs special protections in 
order to grow.”113  Consequently, defamation laws as they relate to the Internet may need 
to adapt as well.  What Congress needs and wants to encourage may change over time.  
Such a broad, but relatively undefined immunity is not necessary, nor is it appropriate at 
this time.114  Revisiting the CDA will allow Congress to evaluate and adjust its original 
goals.  It will be able to better focus liability immunity on the parties for which it was 
intended. 
¶43 Redefining the intellectual property exception to service provider immunity so it 
does not include state claims is also necessary because of the lack of uniformity among 
state intellectual property rights.  While federal intellectual property laws are well 
defined, “[s]tates have any number of laws that could be characterized as intellectual 
 
107 Abril, supra note 47, at 6.  
108 Id. 
109 See Bradley C. Nahrstadt & Jeremy T. Burton, Must You Watch What You Say? Application of CDA 
to Publications on the Internet, 12 No. 9 J. INTERNET L. 1, 21–22 (2009). 
110 Id. at 17.  See also Laurin H. Mills & Leslie Paul Machado, ISP Immunity Provision is Broadly 
Interpreted but One Exception Exists When a Violation of Trademark Law is Alleged, NAT’L L.J., Apr. 15, 
2002, at 6 (Protecting ISPs from most tort claims but not trademark claims is “certain to inspire some 
strained trademark claims as creative plaintiffs’ attorneys attempt to circumvent the § 230 immunities in 
search of deep pockets.”). 
111 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)–(b) (2006). 
112 Abril, supra note 47, at 4. 
113 Troiano, supra note 21, at 1467–68. 
114 See id. at 1470–71.  See also Abril, supra note 47, at 5. 
 309
N O R T H W E S T E R N  J O U R N AL  O F  T E C H N O L O G Y  A N D  I N T E L L E C T U A L  P R O P E R TY  [ 2 0 1 0  
 
property laws:  trademark, unfair competition, dilution, right of publicity and trade 
defamation . . . .”115  If all possible state intellectual property claims are included in the 
CDA’s immunity exception, service providers must be aware of all the widely varied 
laws.116  This unfortunately adds a greater burden to service providers as they struggle to 
comply with differing state laws.117 
¶44 In order to effectively and efficiently encourage innovation, as Congress originally 
intended, there must be a clear boundary demarking the claims for which an internet 
service provider is immune or liable.118  This lack of a clear definition is further 
complicated by the fact that information on the Internet is visible in multiple states and 
jurisdictions.119  Consequently, any single state’s definition of an intellectual property 
claim directly defines a service provider’s immunity.120  The likely result in this situation 
is that the lowest applicable state law standard becomes the bar that a website or service 
provider must meet.121  In other words, the issues caused by the lack of uniformity among 
different state intellectual property laws further highlight why Congress should specify 
the exact extent of the § 230(e)(2) exception. 
¶45 Finally, the overall policy of the Communications Decency Act and § 230 point in 
favor of only federal intellectual property claims being excluded from the service 
provider immunity.  Although the Internet has grown from an emerging medium to a 
mature and established platform, Congress’s original First Amendment concerns are still 
applicable.  When first considering the CDA, Congress felt that the Internet had great 
potential for making information available to citizens and for providing necessary 
“political, educational, cultural, and entertainment services.”122  Furthermore, it 
“recognized the threat that tort-based lawsuits pose to freedom of speech in the new and 
burgeoning Internet medium.”123  The service provider liability immunity attempts to 
eliminate what could otherwise be a chilling effect on free speech.124  However, these 
concerns still exist.  If the new and innovative services that exist today are partially a 
result of the freedom from fear of liability for service providers, further innovation will 
slow when the immunity is removed.  Immunity is just as important today as when the 
 
115 Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1119 n.5 (9th Cir. 2007).  The court further 
explained, “[S]tate laws protecting ‘intellectual property,’ however defined, are by no means uniform.  
Such laws may bear various names, provide for varying causes of action and remedies, and have varying 
purposes and policy goals.”  Id. at 1118.  See also Minora, supra note 3, at 852 (“The right of publicity is a 
state law doctrine; therefore, its acceptance and application vary among the twenty-four jurisdictions that 
recognize it.”). 
116 See Perfect 10, 488 F.3d at 1118.  
117 Purcell, supra note 106, at 626. 
118 See Atl. Recording Corp. v. Project Playlist, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 2d 690, 703 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
119 Purcell, supra note 106, at 626–27. 
120 See Perfect 10, 488 F.3d at 1119. 
121 The Doe court states that the Ninth Circuit in Perfect 10 and the defendants in its own case argued 
but could not state an example of state law’s definition of intellectual property that differs from the federal 
law.  Doe v. Friendfinder Network, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 288, 301 (D.N.H. 2008).  However, even the 
possibility of a difference injects uncertainty into the CDA’s coverage which restricts the statute from 
achieving its intended goals. 
122 47 U.S.C. § 230(a) (2006). 
123 Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997). 
124 Id. at 331. 
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Internet was first being developed, because new technologies and applications still 
continue to be created and evolve.125  
¶46 Practicality concerns also play an important role.  As new services continue to 
evolve, service providers desire a degree of predictability.  Certainty allows a provider to 
know when it can freely innovate and when it can only do so while risking a lawsuit.  
Interpreting § 230(e)(2) to include all types of intellectual property claims forces service 
providers to be even more diligent in monitoring the information on their services.  While 
this is an admirable goal, it is likely an impossible task considering the growth of the 
amount of information content being produced and provided on the Internet.  Overall, a 
narrow intellectual property exception to the CDA is necessary to continue to foster 
growth and provide incentives to innovate.  Innovation on the Internet has not slowed 
from its incredible beginning as services continue to evolve and new applications 
develop.  The open nature, minimal regulation, and protection from harmful liability are 
still necessary components to that rapid growth and evolution.  Because the current text 
of the CDA exempts state law claims that pertain to intellectual property from service 
provider immunity, Congress should reevaluate the statute.  It should clarify and 
specifically define the boundaries of the intellectual property exception in a narrow 
manner. 
V. CONCLUSION 
¶47 The passage of the Communications Decency Act has removed much of the 
potential liability for internet services providing third-party content.  This immunity has 
coincided with extensive growth and innovation of new internet services.  There does 
remain an important exception for laws pertaining to intellectual property rights.  
Because it is unclear whether service providers are immune from state intellectual 
property laws, a split in interpretation has developed among several circuit courts of 
appeals.  
¶48 By analyzing the plain language of the statute’s text and not focusing on uncertain 
policy implications, courts should hold that state intellectual property claims, such as the 
right of publicity, are exempt from the CDA’s grant of immunity.  However, because this 
interpretation will likely have important policy implications, Congress should reevaluate 
the CDA and its intellectual property exception.  The exception may eventually overtake 
the general rule of liability immunity.  This will cause needless uncertainty because of the 
differences and lack of uniformity among various state interpretations of state intellectual 
property rights.  Finally, Congress should further define the intellectual property 
exception, because its original policy goals of maintaining free speech and fostering 
growth and innovation are still applicable and necessary today. 
¶49 Congress chose to allow some potential harm to individuals in favor of not stifling 
growth of the newly created Internet.  Even in its developed form, the Internet continues 
to experience growth and innovation, while becoming even more a part of people’s lives.  
These issues are unlikely to disappear, so it is necessary to continue to evaluate the 
purposes and effects of legislation like the Communications Decency Act.  Although it is 
far more developed since its beginning, the Internet is still a relatively new medium, and 
 
125 See Abril, supra note 47, at 4; Purcell, supra note 106, at 632. 
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favorable policies are necessary to maintain its growth.  By granting immunity to service 
providers, individuals harmed by third-party content do lose a potential party to hold 
liable, but there always remains the possibility of holding the content provider 
responsible.  
¶50 In addition, the service providers themselves always have an incentive to protect 
their users as they are forced to compete for business with other service providers.  With 
clear and well-defined boundaries for service provider liability, both the service provider 
and the individual user can adjust behavior and operate based on known risks.  
Furthermore, because the pace of change and development for internet services is so 
quick, legislation and policies, even if only a few years old, may no longer be achieving 
the goals for which they were originally written.  Congress must continually evaluate and 
adjust the incentives and protections, because, with these goals in mind, it is possible to 
maintain the growth and online innovation all parties desire. 
